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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Sherry J. Oshiver brought suit against the 
Philadelphia law firm of Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, where 
she had been employed as an attorney, claiming violations of both 
Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.  This is an 
appeal from the district court's dismissal of Oshiver's 
complaint, upon the law firm's motion, on the ground that 
Oshiver's claims were time-barred.  We will affirm the district 
court's dismissal of Oshiver's discriminatory failure to hire 
claim, and reverse the district court's dismissal of Oshiver's 
discriminatory discharge claim. 
 I. 
 Oshiver, who had applied for a position as an associate 
attorney at Levin, Fishbein, Sedran, & Berman (the "firm") in 
May, 1989, was instead hired as an hourly attorney, having been 
informed that there were no salaried positions available at that 
time.  When she was hired, however, she was also advised by the 
firm that she would be considered for an associate position if 
and when an opening occurred. 
  
 On April 10, 1990, Oshiver was dismissed with the 
explanation that the firm did not have sufficient work to sustain 
her position as an hourly employee at that time, but that the 
firm would contact her if either additional hourly work or an 
associate position became available. 
 In January, 1991, having been unable to secure 
employment since her dismissal, Oshiver applied for unemployment 
compensation benefits.  At a benefits hearing on May 21, 1991, 
Oshiver learned that shortly after her dismissal, a male attorney 
had been hired by the firm to take over her duties as an hourly 
employee.  Nearly six months after acquiring this information, on 
November 8, 1991, Oshiver filed administrative complaints with 
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission ("PHRC") and the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging that 
her dismissal was the product of gender discrimination. 
 In January, 1992, Oshiver learned that the firm had 
hired a male attorney as an associate in May of 1991, without 
notifying her that an associate position had opened.  The firm's 
failure to hire her as an associate, according to Oshiver, 
constituted an additional instance of gender discrimination.  
Thus, Oshiver amended her administrative complaints in early 
April, 1992, to include a claim of discriminatory failure to 
hire. 
 On September 28, 1992, the EEOC issued Oshiver a right 
to sue letter, and on December 21, 1992, she filed a complaint in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania alleging discrimination under Title VII of the Civil 
  
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII") and 
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. 
 The district court granted the firm's motion to dismiss 
Oshiver's complaint, holding that her federal claims were 
time-barred because the statutory limitations period had begun to 
run on April 10, 1990, the day the firm dismissed Oshiver; on 
that day, the court concluded, Oshiver knew or had reason to know 
that an alleged discriminatory act had occurred.  The district 
court refused to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to 
excuse Oshiver's failure to file her EEOC charge timely, finding 
nothing in Oshiver's complaint to suggest that the law firm had 
misled her respecting her cause of action. 
 In reviewing the district court's dismissal of 
Oshiver's claims of discrimination, we are called upon to balance 
the relevant statutorily mandated deadlines against certain 
tolling doctrines that might apply to extend them. 
 II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  Since this is an appeal from a district court's 
dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we exercise plenary review.  
Ditri v. Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, Inc., 954 F.2d 
869, 871 (3d Cir. 1992).1  We accept all facts pleaded as true 
                     
1
.   While the language of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c) indicates that a 
statute of limitations defense cannot be used in the context of a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, an exception is made where the 
complaint facially shows noncompliance with the limitations 
period and the affirmative defense clearly appears on the face of 
the pleading.  See Trevino v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 916 
F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1990); 5A Wright and Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure:  Civil 2d, § 1357. 
  
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, 
D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 972 F.2d 
1364, 1367 (3d Cir. 1992), focussing on the pleadings2 to 
determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which 
relief may be granted. 
 III. 
 As noted above, the timeliness of Oshiver's 
administrative complaints is the key issue before us.  Oshiver 
claims that her charges under Title VII were timely brought 
because the statutory limitations period did not begin to run 
until May 21, 1991, when she first discovered that the firm had 
hired a male attorney to assume her former duties as an hourly 
employee.  Therefore, Oshiver argues, her filing on November 8, 
1991, was timely.  The firm disagrees, as did the district court.  
In the firm's view, the statute of limitations began to run on 
the date of Oshiver's termination, April 10, 1990, thus rendering 
Oshiver's administrative complaints untimely. 
 Title VII, like the PHRA, allows a plaintiff to bring 
suit within 180 days after the alleged act of discrimination; 
however, if the plaintiff initially filed a complaint with a 
state or local agency with authority to adjudicate the claim, he 
or she is allotted 300 days from the date of the alleged 
discrimination within which to file a charge of employment 
                     
2
.   We may also consider matters of public record, orders, 
exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in the 
record of the case.  5A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure:  Civil 2d, § 1357; Chester County Intermediate Unit v. 
Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1990).  
  
discrimination with the EEOC.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).3  
Therefore, since Oshiver filed a complaint with the PHRA, she had 
300 days after the alleged act of discrimination in which to 
bring a charge with the EEOC.  See Davis v. Calgon Corp., 627 
F.2d 674, 675 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (300-day limitations 
period applied even though plaintiff's filing with state agency 
was untimely).4 
 There are two doctrines which might apply in this case 
to extend the time period Oshiver had in which to file her 
charges of discrimination:  the discovery rule and the equitable 
tolling doctrine.  As the Seventh Circuit observed in Cada v. 
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1990), these 
theories, and their application, invite confusion.  We will first 
                     
3
.   42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) states, in pertinent part: 
 
  A charge under this section shall be filed within 
one hundred and eighty days after the alleged 
unlawful employment practice occurred . . . except 
that in a case of unlawful employment practice 
with respect to which the person aggrieved has 
initially instituted proceedings with a State or 
local agency with authority to grant or seek 
relief from such practice or to institute criminal 
proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving 
notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or 
on behalf of the person aggrieved within three 
hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment 
practice occurred. . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). 
4
.   While Davis was brought under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), Title VII and the ADEA have been 
given parallel constructions due to their similarities in purpose 
and structure.  Kocian v. Getty Refining & Marketing Co., 707 
F.2d 748, 752 n.3 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1983).  See also Oscar Mayer & 
Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979). 
  
discuss each of these doctrines and then apply them in turn to 
determine whether Oshiver timely filed her discrimination claims. 
 A. The Discovery Rule 
 We begin with the discovery rule.5  As a general rule, 
the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff's 
cause of action accrues.  Cada, 920 F.2d at 450.  As the court in 
Cada noted, the accrual date is not the date on which the wrong 
that injures the plaintiff occurs, but the date on which the 
plaintiff discovers that he or she has been injured.  Id.  There 
will, of course, be times when the aggrieved person learns of the 
alleged unlawful employment practice, for example, at the very 
moment the unlawful employment practice occurs; in such cases the 
statutory period begins to run upon the occurrence of the alleged 
unlawful employment practice.  However, there will also be 
occasions when an aggrieved person does not discover the 
occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice until some 
                     
5
.   Because the discovery rule's origins are in products 
liability and medical malpractice cases, the rule finds perhaps 
its most natural application in cases where legal injury flows 
from physical injury.  The discovery rule, however, is not 
limited in its application to situations involving bodily injury, 
and may also apply in cases involving alleged employment 
discrimination, where the actual injury at issue is not physical 
in the same way that bodily injury is physical.  In this regard 
we agree with the court in Cada that the discovery rule is 
implicit in Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980).  
Cada, 920 F.2d at 450.  In Ricks, a Title VII case, the Supreme 
Court held that the statute of limitations began to run "at the 
time the [alleged discriminatory] tenure decision was made and 
communicated to Ricks."  Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258 (emphasis 
supplied).  See also Ohemeng v. Delaware State College, 643 F. 
Supp. 1575, 1580 (D. Del. 1986) (Roth, J.) (applying discovery 
rule in Title VII setting). 
  
time after it occurred.  The discovery rule functions in this 
latter scenario to postpone the beginning of the statutory 
limitations period from the date when the alleged unlawful 
employment practice occurred, to the date when the plaintiff 
actually discovered he or she had been injured.  Cada, 920 F.2d 
at 450.  In either scenario, once the plaintiff's cause of action 
has accrued, that is, once the plaintiff has discovered the 
injury, the statutory limitations period begins to run and the 
plaintiff is afforded the full limitations period, starting from 
the point of claim accrual, in which to file his or her claim of 
discrimination.  Id. at 452 ("[I]t is entirely clear that the 
discovery rule if applicable gives the plaintiff the entire 
statute of limitations period in which to sue, counting from the 
date of discovery. . . ."). 
 A claim accrues in a federal cause of action as soon as 
a potential claimant either is aware, or should be aware, of the 
existence of and source of an injury.  See Keystone Insurance Co. 
v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1127 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating this 
general proposition in the context of determining the accrual 
date of a RICO cause of action).  A different rule, we have 
noted, would require an insufficient degree of diligence on the 
part of the potential claimant.  Keystone Insurance, 863 F.2d at 
1127.  With specific regard to Title VII claims, and in a similar 
vein, the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware observed that the limitations period for Title VII 
claims begins to run, under federal law, "`when the plaintiff 
knows or reasonably should know that the discriminatory act has 
  
occurred.'"  Ohemeng v. Delaware State College, 643 F. Supp. 
1575, 1580 (D.Del. 1986) (Roth, J.) (quoting McWilliams v. 
Escambia County School Board, 658 F.2d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 1981)).  
Thus, the "polestar" of the discovery rule is not the plaintiff's 
actual knowledge of injury, but rather whether the knowledge was 
known, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence, knowable 
to the plaintiff.  See Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 925 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (construing Pennsylvania law and applying the 
discovery rule in connection with a medical malpractice cause of 
action) (citations omitted).  In short, the discovery rule 
functions to delay the initial running of the statutory 
limitations period, but only until the plaintiff has discovered 
or, by exercising reasonable diligence, should have discovered 
(1) that he or she has been injured, and (2) that this injury has 
been caused by another party's conduct.  Bohus, 950 F.2d at 924. 
 The question arises whether a plaintiff's discovery of 
the actual, as opposed to the legal, injury is sufficient to 
trigger the running of the statutory period.  In other words, 
does the statutory period begin to run upon a plaintiff's 
learning that he or she has been discharged from employment, for 
example, or does it begin to run only after a plaintiff comes to 
realize that the discharge constituted a legal wrong?  We have in 
the past stated that a claim accrues in a federal cause of action 
upon awareness of actual injury, not upon awareness that this 
injury constitutes a legal wrong.  See Keystone Insurance, 863 
F.2d at 1127.  See also Bohus, 950 F.2d at 924-25 (In order for a 
claim to accrue, "[t]he plaintiff need not know the exact medical 
  
cause of the injury; that the injury is due to another's 
negligent conduct; or that he [or she] has a cause of action.") 
(citations omitted).  Likewise, by indicating that the discovery 
rule postpones the beginning of the limitations period from the 
date a plaintiff was wronged until the date a plaintiff discovers 
that he or she was injured, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit in Cada has, at least by implication, suggested that 
awareness of actual injury, as opposed to legal injury, is 
sufficient to trigger the running of the statutory period.  Cada, 
920 F.2d at 450.  See also Merrill v. Southern Methodist 
University, 806 F.2d 600, 604-05 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that 
the limitations period in Title VII cases starts to run on the 
date when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that the 
discriminatory act has occurred, not on the date the victim first 
perceived that a discriminatory motive caused the act).  
 B.  Equitable Tolling 
 1. 
 We preface our analysis of the equitable tolling 
doctrine with the observation that the time limitations set forth 
in Title VII are not jurisdictional.  See Hart v. J.T. Baker 
Chemical Co., 598 F.2d 829, 831 (3d Cir. 1979).  These time 
limitations are analogous to a statute of limitations and are, 
therefore, subject to equitable modifications, such as tolling.  
Id.  Such treatment of Title VII's time limitation provisions is 
in keeping with our goal of interpreting humanitarian legislation 
in a humane and commonsensical manner so as to prevent 
unnecessarily harsh results in particular cases.  Id. 
  
 Where the filing requirements are considered 
"jurisdictional," non-compliance bars an 
action regardless of the equities in a given 
case.  Thus equitable tolling could not be 
invoked where, for example, the employer 
prevented the employee from asserting his or 
her rights by actively concealing or 
misleading the discharged employee as to the 
true reasons for the discharge.  We conclude 
therefore that the timing provisions should 
be subject to a similar type of equitable 
tolling as is applied to statutes of 
limitations. 
Id. at 832. 
 Equitable tolling functions to stop the statute of 
limitations from running where the claim's accrual date has 
already passed.  Cada, 920 F.2d at 450.  We have instructed that 
there are three principal, though not exclusive, situations in 
which equitable tolling may be appropriate:  (1) where the 
defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the 
plaintiff's cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some 
extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his or her 
rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her 
rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.  School District of City of 
Allentown v. Marshall, 657 F.2d 16, 19-20 (3d Cir. 1981) (quoting 
Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 109 (2d 
Cir. 1978); see also Miller v. Beneficial Management Corp., 977 
F.2d 834, 845 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).6 
                     
6
.   Our discussion of equitable tolling in this case is germane 
only to those cases in which the doctrine is considered in 
connection with a defendant's deception regarding the plaintiff's 
cause of action.  The other two established situations to which 
equitable tolling applies give rise to equitable considerations 
wholly unrelated to our discussion of the doctrine here. 
  
 In Meyer v. Riegel Products Corporation, 720 F.2d 303 
(3d Cir. 1983), a case involving the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., we observed 
that although the time limitations prescribed by Congress must be 
"treated seriously," cases may arise "`where the employer's own 
acts or omissions have lulled the plaintiff into foregoing prompt 
attempts to vindicate his [or her] rights.'"  Meyer, 720 F.2d at 
307 (quoting Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 569 F.2d 187, 
193 (3d Cir. 1977)).  In such cases, equitable tolling may be 
appropriate.  Id.  See also Smith v. American President Lines, 
Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 109 n.12 (2d Cir. 1978) ("The primary 
consideration underlying statutes of limitations is that of 
fairness to the defendant . . .  The most common and justifiable 
of the exceptions to the running of statutes of limitations[, 
therefore,] is based upon affirmative acts of the defendant which 
have impeded suit.").  We have held, in the context of employment 
discrimination cases, that the equitable tolling doctrine may 
excuse the plaintiff's non-compliance with the statutory 
limitations provision at issue when it appears that (1) the 
defendant actively misled the plaintiff respecting the reason for 
the plaintiff's discharge, and (2) this deception caused the 
plaintiff's non-compliance with the limitations provision.  See 
Meyer, 720 F.2d at 308-09. 
 The Meyer and Hart cases are helpful in our present 
endeavor to sketch the contours of the equitable tolling doctrine 
insofar as it applies to cases involving alleged employer 
deception. 
  
 In Hart, a defendant employer discharged the plaintiff, 
a female biochemist.  At the time of her discharge, the plaintiff 
(Hart) was given four reasons for her dismissal, all unrelated to 
her gender.  Hart, 598 F.2d at 830 n.2.  Hart filed an untimely 
charge of gender discrimination with the EEOC.  She later brought 
suit under Title VII.  The district court granted the employer's 
motion for summary judgment, finding that (1) Hart had untimely 
filed her EEOC charge and (2) the facts of the case did not call 
for equitable tolling.  Id. at 831. 
 We affirmed the district court's refusal to apply the 
equitable tolling doctrine, finding that all of the facts upon 
which Hart's charge of discrimination was predicated were known 
to her on the date of her discharge.  Id. at 833. 
 As a result, it cannot be said that the 
district court erred in deciding that at the 
time of plaintiff's discharge, her suspicions 
were sufficient to lead a reasonable person 
to inquire further into the reasons for her 
discharge.  Accordingly, the district court 
committed no reversible error in declining to 
toll the filing requirements of Title VII. 
Id. at 834.  We also expressed concern over the extended period 
between Hart's discharge and her first contact with the EEOC, a 
period of 421 days.  In the absence of evidence that the 
defendant employer had contributed to Hart's delay in filing, it 
could be "extremely unfair," we reasoned, to require the employer 
to defend against Hart's lawsuit.  Id. 
 The Plaintiff in Meyer was 61 years old when he was 
discharged.  Suspecting age discrimination, Meyer contacted his 
former employer shortly after his termination and sought the 
  
reason for his dismissal.  The employer informed Meyer that he 
had been dismissed due to a "reorganization."  Meyer, 720 F.2d at 
305.  After filing a charge of age discrimination with the United 
States Department of Labor, Meyer brought suit against the 
employer.  Meyer, 720 F.2d at 306.  The district court granted 
the employer's motion for summary judgment, finding that Meyer 
had failed to file a timely charge with the Department of Labor.  
In arriving at this conclusion, the court explicitly rejected 
Meyer's plea to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling, noting 
that his own statements revealed that he suspected from the day 
of his discharge that he had been dismissed because of his age.  
Id. at 306. 
 We reversed the district court's summary dismissal of 
Meyer's ADEA claim.  We found that he had alleged acts on the 
part of the employer that, taken as alleged, could persuade a 
court to activate the doctrine of equitable tolling.  We then 
emphasized the differences between Meyer and Hart: 
 In Hart, plaintiff-employee suspected at the 
time of her dismissal that gender may have 
played an operative factor in the discharge.  
She did not file the required charge letter, 
however, until 477 days after the 
discriminatory act allegedly took place.  The 
applicable limitation period had been 180 
days.  In affirming the district court's 
rejection of the equitable tolling claim, we 
noted that "the facts upon which her charge 
was predicated were known to her on the date 
of the discharge."  In short, plaintiff 
simply did not allege that defendant had 
anything to do with her untimeliness.  The 
court observed that, had plaintiff inquired 
into the reasons for her dismissal and then 
alleged that she had been deceived, an 
entirely different issue would have been 
  
presented.  Here, however, plaintiff Meyer 
alleges precisely what the plaintiff in Hart 
failed to allege:  that defendants deceived 
him into postponing the filing of a claim.  
Here, too, plaintiff did precisely what the 
Hart court suggests:  he asked defendants for 
an explanation of his dismissal. 
Id. at 308 (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied). 
 2. 
 We next address the important question concerning the 
amount of time a plaintiff is afforded in which to file an 
otherwise untimely charge or complaint when equitable tolling is 
activated by the defendant employer's deception regarding the 
plaintiff's cause of action.  We have not, prior to this case, 
provided an answer. 
 We begin by restating the fundamental rule of equity 
that a party should not be permitted to profit from its own 
wrongdoing.  This basic principle underlies the equitable tolling 
doctrine itself.  See Miklavic v. USAir Inc., 21 F.3d 551, 557 
(3d Cir. 1994).  To allow a defendant to benefit from the statute 
of limitations defense after intentionally misleading the 
plaintiff with regard to the cause of action, thereby causing the 
plaintiff's tardiness, would be "manifestly unjust."  Cf. 
Miklavic, 21 F.3d at 557.  See also LaVallee Northside Civic 
Ass'n v. Coastal Zone Management, 866 F.2d 616, 625 (3d Cir. 
1989) (stating that equitable tolling is based on the equitable 
principle that, having unfairly lulled the plaintiff into 
inaction, the defendant may not profit by such wrongful conduct 
through invocation of the statute of limitations defense). 
  
 Against the back-drop of this principle, we are lead to 
conclude that where a defendant actively misleads the plaintiff 
regarding the reason for the plaintiff's dismissal, the statute 
of limitations will not begin to run, that is, will be tolled, 
until the facts which would support the plaintiff's cause of 
action are apparent, or should be apparent to a person with a 
reasonably prudent regard for his or her rights.  This is the 
rule set forth by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 
Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924 (5th 
Cir. 1975).  It has been recognized and applied by a number of 
our sister circuits, see Vaught v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 745 
F.2d 407, 410-12 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying Reeb and referring to 
it the "seminal case" in the area of equitable tolling); 
Wilkerson v. Siegfried Ins. Agency, Inc., 683 F.2d 344, 345-46 
(10th Cir. 1982) (applying Reeb); Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery 
Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1531-32 (11th Cir. 1992) (same), and 
we adopt it here. 
 In Reeb, the plaintiff, a woman, was employed by 
Economic Opportunity of Atlanta (the "EOA").  The EOA terminated 
Reeb's employment, citing a "limitation of funds" as the reason.  
Reeb, 516 F.2d at 926.  Nearly seven months later, Reeb learned 
that soon after dismissing her, the EOA had given her former 
position to an allegedly less qualified male employee.  Upon 
learning of her replacement, Reeb filed charges of gender 
discrimination with the EEOC.  The district court dismissed the 
case on the ground that Reeb had failed to file her 
administrative complaint within ninety days of the alleged 
  
discriminatory discharge.  Id.  The court of appeals vacated the 
district court's judgment dismissing the case.  Id. at 931.  
Finding that the 90-day period did not begin to run until Reeb 
had learned of the EOA's replacement hire, the court of appeals 
stated: 
 [I]t is alleged that the EOA actively sought 
to mislead Mrs. Reeb in informing her that 
adequate funds for her program would no 
longer be available.  It is further alleged 
that the facts that would alert a reasonable 
person to the unlawful discrimination only 
became known to the plaintiff more than six 
months after the discriminatory act. . . .  
In these circumstances we apply the familiar 
equitable modification to statutes of 
limitation:  the statute does not begin to 
run until the facts which would support a 
cause of action are apparent or should be 
apparent to a person with a reasonably 
prudent regard for his [or her] rights. 
Id. at 930. 
 Thus, where the plaintiff has been actively misled 
regarding the reason for his or her discharge, the equitable 
tolling doctrine provides the plaintiff with the full statutory 
limitations period, starting from the date the facts supporting 
the plaintiff's cause of action either become apparent to the 
plaintiff or should have become apparent to a person in the 
plaintiff's position with a reasonably prudent regard for his or 
her rights.  The appropriateness of this rule, as a matter of 
equity, can be illustrated by reference to Cada. 
  
 The court in Cada distinguished "equitable estoppel" 
and "equitable tolling."7  According to Cada, equitable estoppel 
arises where the defendant has attempted to mislead the plaintiff 
and thus prevent the plaintiff from suing on time.  Id. at 452.  
Thus, according to Cada, equitable estoppel requires a showing of 
inequitable conduct on the part of the defendant.  In contrast, 
for equitable tolling, all the plaintiff need show is that he or 
she could not, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, have 
discovered essential information bearing on his or her claim.  
Id.  With this contrast in mind, the court went on to discuss the 
remedy each doctrine affords: 
 [I]f fraudulent concealment [i.e., equitable 
estoppel] is shown[,] the court must subtract 
from the period of limitations the entire 
period in which the tolling condition is in 
effect, for otherwise the defendant would 
obtain a benefit from his [or her] 
inequitable conduct[.  However,] it is not at 
all clear that equitable tolling -- a 
doctrine that adjusts the rights of two 
innocent parties -- is as generous. . .  We 
do not think equitable tolling should bring 
about an automatic extension of the statute 
of limitations by the length of the tolling 
period. . .  It is, after all, an equitable 
doctrine.  It gives the plaintiff extra time 
if he [or she] needs it.  If [the plaintiff] 
doesn't need it there is no basis for 
depriving the defendant of the protection of 
the statute of limitations.  Statutes of 
                     
7
.   The doctrine which the Seventh Circuit describes as 
"equitable estoppel" appears to be the same, in all important 
respects, as our "equitable tolling" insofar as our "equitable 
tolling" excuses a late filing where such tardiness results from 
active deception on the part of the defendant.  We note that what 
the Seventh Circuit in Cada calls "equitable tolling" is not what 
we are describing when we use and apply the same term in the 
context of employer deception. 
  
limitations are not arbitrary obstacles to 
the vindication of just claims . . . they 
protect important social interests in 
certainty, accuracy, and repose.  When we are 
speaking not of equitable estoppel but of 
equitable tolling, we are (to repeat) dealing 
with two innocent parties and in these 
circumstances the negligence of the party 
invoking the doctrine can tip the balance 
against its application. . . . 
Id. at 452-53. 
 We agree that where the plaintiff's failure to file 
timely cannot be attributed to any inequitable conduct on the 
part of the defendant, an automatic extension of the statute of 
limitations by the length of the tolling period does not make 
sense as a matter of equity.  However, such an automatic 
extension makes eminent equitable sense where the defendant has, 
by deceptive conduct, caused the plaintiff's untimeliness. 
C. 
 By way of summary, the discovery rule and the equitable 
tolling doctrine are similar in one respect and different in 
another.  The doctrines are similar in that each requires a level 
of diligence on the part of the plaintiff; that is, each requires 
the plaintiff to take reasonable measures to uncover the 
existence of injury.  See Keystone Insurance, 863 F.2d at 1127 
(making this point with regard to the discovery rule); Reeb, 516 
F.2d at 930 (making this point with regard to equitable tolling).  
The plaintiff who fails to exercise this reasonable diligence may 
lose the benefit of either doctrine.  The two doctrines differ, 
however, with respect to the type of knowledge or cognizance that 
triggers their respective applications.  The discovery rule keys 
  
on a plaintiff's cognizance, or imputed cognizance, of actual 
injury.  See Merrill, 806 F.2d at 604-05. Equitable tolling, on 
the other hand, keys on a plaintiff's cognizance, or imputed 
cognizance, of the facts supporting the plaintiff's cause of 
action.8  Underlying this difference between the discovery rule 
and equitable tolling is the more fundamental difference in 
purpose between the two rules.  The purpose of the discovery rule 
is to determine the accrual date of a claim, for ultimate 
purposes of determining, as a legal matter, when the statute of 
limitations begins to run.  Equitable tolling, at least as the 
doctrine might apply in Oshiver's case, presumes claim accrual.  
Equitable tolling steps in to toll, or stop, the running of the 
statute of limitations in light of established equitable 
considerations.   
III. 
 We now apply the discovery rule and the doctrine of 
equitable tolling to Oshiver's claims. 
                     
8
.   Of course, cognizance of the facts supporting the 
plaintiff's cause of action presumes cognizance of actual injury. 
  
 A. 
 With regard to Oshiver's claim of discriminatory 
discharge, we have no difficulty in concluding that for purposes 
of the discovery rule, Oshiver "discovered" the injury on April 
10, 1990, the very date defendant law firm informed her of her 
discharge.  Simply put, at the moment the law firm conveyed her 
dismissal to her, Oshiver became aware (1) that she had been 
injured, i.e., discharged, and (2) that this injury had been 
caused by another party's conduct.  That Oshiver may have been 
deceived regarding the underlying motive behind her discharge is 
irrelevant for purposes of the discovery rule.  See Keystone 
Insurance, 863 F.2d at 1127. 
 Having discovered the injury associated with her 
alleged wrongful discharge on April 10, 1990, it is clear that 
the discovery rule offers Oshiver no relief in relation to the 
timeliness of the filing of her discriminatory discharge claim.  
This filing occurred on November 8, 1991.  Oshiver's wrongful 
discharge action accrued on April 10, 1990.  Oshiver waited some 
440 days before filing her administrative complaint, or too long 
by some 140 days.9 
                     
9
.   An argument can be made that since Oshiver had been hired as 
a temporary employee, she did not know, and could not have been 
expected to know, that she had been injured until she learned, 
later on, that the law firm had hired another hourly temporary 
employee a few weeks after her discharge.  However, this argument 
overlooks the fact that the discovery rule hinges upon actual, as 
opposed to legal, injury.  That Oshiver may not have known on 
April 10, 1990, that her discharge constituted an actionable 
legal wrong does not matter for discovery rule purposes. 
  
 We next address whether Oshiver's discriminatory 
failure to hire claim is saved by the operation of the discovery 
rule.  In so doing, it bears repeating that the discovery rule 
requires the plaintiff to exercise reasonable diligence in the 
ascertainment of injury.  We cannot say that Oshiver exercised 
the reasonable diligence required by the discovery rule in 
connection with her discovery of the firm's hiring of the male 
associate.  This hiring occurred sometime in May of 1991.  Had 
Oshiver exercised reasonable diligence -- had she, for example, 
telephoned the law firm periodically to monitor the status of her 
own outstanding associate application, or checked with the firm 
in May of 1991 after learning that it had hired an hourly 
attorney shortly after discharging her -- she would almost 
certainly have discovered the associate hiring much earlier.  
Thus, the discovery rule affords Oshiver no relief in connection 
with the timing of the filing of her failure to hire claim. 
 B. 
 We now apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to 
Oshiver's discriminatory discharge claim.10  
                     
10
.  We do not apply this doctrine to Oshiver's failure to hire 
claim, however, because nowhere in the complaint does Oshiver 
allege that the law firm misled her, actively or otherwise, with 
respect to this claim.  Accordingly, there is no basis for the 
application of the equitable tolling doctrine.  Oshiver's 
complaint in this regard merely alleges that the firm told her 
that she would be considered for an associate position if one 
became available, but did not contact her upon the opening of an 
associate position.  Thus, at most, Oshiver alleges that the firm 
concealed from her the fact that an associate opening arose.  To 
be activated, equitable tolling requires active misleading on the 
part of the defendant.  The type of concealment Oshiver alleges 
  
 Oshiver's complaint alleges that at the time of her 
dismissal, the firm offered the explanation that it had no work 
for her to perform.  Oshiver also alleges in her complaint that 
she learned in May of 1991 that she had been replaced by a male, 
and that "apparently there was work to do at the firm."  (Joint 
Appendix at 20a).  The district court concluded that the 
allegations in Oshiver's complaint were insufficient to invoke 
the doctrine of equitable tolling.  However, this issue was 
raised in the context of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  The district court was to accept all 
allegations of fact as true and draw all reasonable inferences in 
Oshiver's favor.  Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 
972 F.2d at 1367.  Therefore, all that was required of Oshiver at 
this stage was that she plead the applicability of the doctrine.  
A fair reading of Oshiver's complaint is that she claims that the 
firm told her there was no work when "apparently there was 
. . .," a fact which she learned for the first time much later.  
Thus, Oshiver's allegations essentially charge that (1) the firm 
actively misled her regarding the reason for her discharge, and 
(2) the critical fact that would have alerted a reasonable person 
to the alleged unlawful discrimination only became known to 
Oshiver on May 21, 1991.  We find that these allegations, taken 
as true and giving Oshiver the benefit of all reasonable 
(..continued) 
is, in our view, qualitatively different from taking affirmative 
steps to mislead. 
  
inferences, are sufficient to activate the doctrine of equitable 
tolling.  See Reeb, 516 F.2d at 930. 
 We offer no view as to whether Oshiver will derive 
ultimate benefit from the equitable tolling doctrine in relation 
to her wrongful discharge claim.  The factual questions remain 
(1) whether the firm effectively misled Oshiver with respect to 
her discriminatory discharge cause of action; (2) if so, whether 
a person such as Oshiver, with a reasonably prudent regard for 
her rights, would have been misled by the firm's communication; 
and (3) if so, whether a person in Oshiver's position with a 
reasonably prudent regard for her rights would have learned of 
the firm's deception sooner.  These factual inquiries must be 
undertaken before a proper resolution of the equitable tolling 
issue can reached. 
 We wish to make clear, however, that the purpose of and 
the remedy afforded by the equitable tolling doctrine, at least 
insofar as it applies in cases involving defendant employer 
deception, are understood properly only in light of the equitable 
principle which underlies the doctrine, namely, that one should 
not be permitted to benefit from his or her own wrongdoing.  See 
Reeb, 516 F.2d at 930 ("`Deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, this 
principle has been applied in many diverse classes of cases by 
both law and equity courts and has frequently been employed to 
bar inequitable reliance on statutes of limitations.'") (quoting 
Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 1959, 359 U.S. 231, 
232-33 (1959)); Miklavic v. USAir, Inc., 21 F.3d at 557.  Our 
conclusion that the equitable tolling doctrine tolls the initial 
  
running of the statutory period until the plaintiff knows, or 
should reasonably be expected to know, the concealed facts 
supporting the cause of action flows directly, and naturally, 
from this fundamental equitable principle.  Unless the plaintiff 
is then given the full statutory period in which to file his or 
her charge of discrimination, starting from the moment he or she 
acquires or constructively acquires such knowledge, the 
defendant's inequitable conduct will have served to shorten the 
limitations period, and thus benefit the defendant.  This is 
precisely the result the equitable tolling doctrine was created 
to avoid. 
 IV. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the 
district court's dismissal of Oshiver's discriminatory failure to 
hire claim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 
and (6).  We will reverse the district court's dismissal of 
Oshiver's discriminatory discharge claim and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
_______________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
